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1. Introduction 
Textbook histories of psychology and animal behaviour research usually identify the 
British philosopher-psychologist, Conwy Lloyd Morgan (1852-1936), as the father of 
modern comparative psychology. The standard narrative has it that, in the last few 
decades of the nineteenth century, comparative studies of animal intelligence had attained 
great significance in the wake of Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution, which was seen 
as predicting “psychological, no less than a physiological continuity extending 
throughout the length and breadth of the animal kingdom” (Romanes, 1882a, p10). 
Darwin (1871) and, most notably, his protégé, George Romanes (1882a, 1883a), sought 
to document the nature and extent of this psychological continuity between humans and 
animals. Morgan, however, criticized the methods employed by Romanes and others, 
particularly their reliance on informal, anecdotal reports of animal intelligence, and was 
deeply sceptical about the sweeping and seemingly romantic claims they had made about 
the impressive psychological capacities of animals. Morgan’s work, in particular his An 
Introduction to Comparative Psychology (1894c), constituted a bold manifesto for a more 
rigorous science of comparative psychology, which ultimately laid the foundations for the 
experimental approaches to comparative psychology that emerged in the early decades of 
the twentieth century.1 
                                                
1 In particular, Morgan’s work has been seen as providing direct inspiration for Thorndike’s (1898) 
experimental studies of animal learning, and thus as an important stimulus for the behaviourist movement. 
As result, Morgan has often been regarded as a proto-behaviourist. However, as numerous Morgan scholars 
have shown (see, e.g., Costall, 1993; Wozniak, 1993; Thomas, 1998), and as will become apparent from 
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Central to Morgan’s scientific reformation of comparative psychology was a 
methodological principle now known as “Morgan’s Canon”: 
 
In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise of a higher 
psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one 
which stands lower in the psychological scale. (Morgan, 1894c, p53). 
 
This principle, intended as a guideline for the interpretation of animal behaviour, went on 
to play an enormously influential role in the subsequent history of comparative 
psychology, and continues to play a significant role in modern debates about the nature of 
animal minds (Radick, 2007; Fitzpatrick, 2008)—so much so that it has been referred to 
as “[p]erhaps, the most quoted statement in the history of comparative psychology” 
(Dewsbury, 1984, p187). Honouring the dictates of Morgan’s Canon is still widely 
believed to be a fundamental prerequisite for scientific rigour when investigating the 
minds of animals. 
Morgan’s attitude towards comparative psychology and its scientific status had, 
however, undergone significant evolution by the time of the writing of the Introduction. 
In a series of papers published in the early-to-mid 1880s, Morgan (1882, 1884a, 1884b, 
1886) expressed a deep scepticism about the very possibility of a genuine science of the 
internal psychological workings of animals. The most that was possible, he argued, was 
“the scientific study of the [external] habits and activities of animals” (Morgan, 1886, 
p180). Yet, by the time of the Introduction, he had become very much a proponent of a 
science of animal minds, and was busy trying to articulate a vision for how it should be 
practiced. 
There has been a fair amount of disagreement amongst scholars of Morgan’s work 
about the nature, timing, and causes of this shift in Morgan’s thinking. For instance, 
Boakes (1984) suggests that Morgan became more optimistic about the prospects for a 
genuine science of animal mentality as a result of the experiments he conducted circa 
1891-1894 on the behavioural development of young chicks and ducklings (Morgan, 
1892b, 1893, 1894a, 1894b), the results of which ran contrary to some of his earlier 
                                                                                                                                            
our discussion, though Morgan’s early views did have somewhat of a proto-behaviourist flavour to them, 
his mature vision for comparative psychology was severely at odds with the approach later advocated by 
the behaviourists. 
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pronouncements in Animal Life and Intelligence (1890-1). This experience supposedly 
prompted Morgan towards the view that, in contrast to the informal, anecdotal approach 
adopted by Romanes, questions about the psychological causes of animal behaviour 
could in fact be satisfactorily answered through controlled experimental methods (see 
also Goodrich and Allen, 2007). Richards (1987), however, sees the chick experiments as 
supplementing a pre-existing impetus towards greater optimism generated by Morgan’s 
evolving monistic view of the relationship between mind and body. According to 
Richards, Morgan’s initial doubts about the possibility of comparative psychology was a 
residue of his early fascination with Bishop Berkeley’s idealism, which precipitated a 
sceptical epistemological stance towards the problem of inferring mental states in non-
human animals. However, in the course of their exchanges during the mid-1880s, 
Romanes managed to convince Morgan that if the dual-aspect monism to which they 
were both inclined was true, a window into the animal mind could be found by 
uncovering homologous “neuroses” (neurophysiological processes) in the brains of 
animals and man, which would then be indicative of homologous “psychoses” (mental 
processes). According to Costall (1993), however, Boakes and Richards fail to appreciate 
the extent of the rapprochement with Romanes. In particular, Boakes and Richards both 
see Morgan’s Canon as functioning as a prophylactic against the anthropomorphism of 
Romanes. Costall says of Morgan’s Introduction that it was “clearly not a ‘revolt’ against 
Romanes’ anthropomorphism, but rather a concession to Romanes’ insistence upon the 
necessity of an anthropomorphic approach to the study of animal psychology” (1993, 
p120). For Costall, then, Morgan eventually ended up aligning himself almost completely 
with the ideas and methods of Romanesian comparative psychology; the Canon was 
simply a tool to make the Romanesian approach more rigorous. 
Despite these disagreements, Boakes, Richards, and Costall view Morgan’s 
Canon as more or less an inevitable consequence of comparative psychology becoming a 
more professionalized and methodologically self-conscious discipline. Radick (2000, 
2007), however, has presented a quite different take on the specific origins of Morgan’s 
Canon. For Radick, Morgan’s Canon was actually a codification of Morgan’s adherence 
to the Lockean doctrine that language was a necessary prerequisite for higher cognition. 
In addition, in particular contrast to Costall and Richards, Radick sees Morgan as a 
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consistent sceptic throughout the 1880s, but one who became rather more optimistic 
about the possibility of a science of animal minds due to his reading of William James 
around 1890-1891. James convinced him that what he and Romanes (following W.K. 
Clifford) had called the “ejective” method in comparative psychology—the method that 
both regarded as fundamental to inferences to mental states in other creatures—could be 
practiced in a rigorous manner. 
While we believe that these scholars have made important contributions to our 
understanding of Morgan’s intellectual development, none of these narratives is fully 
adequate. Our goal in this paper is to provide a more complete picture of this important 
episode in the history of comparative psychology. We will argue that Morgan actually 
underwent two quite different shifts of attitude towards the proper practice of 
comparative psychology. The first, which culminated in Morgan’s Animal Life and 
Intelligence (1890-1), involved a move towards a qualified acceptance of Romanes’ 
approach to comparative psychology. The second, which began not long after the 
publication of Animal Life and Intelligence, culminating with the Introduction of 1894, 
was a shift away from Romanes’ reliance on systematizing the available mostly anecdotal 
evidence towards a thorough-going experimental approach to the investigation of animal 
cognition, focused in particular on studying the development of behaviour. Building on 
the account provided by Richards, we will emphasize the role of Morgan’s evolving 
epistemological views in bringing about the first shift. In particular, we will highlight an 
aspect of Morgan’s work that has attracted very little previous attention: his philosophy 
of science. When it comes to understanding the second shift, we will emphasize the role 
of an intriguing but largely overlooked figure in the history of comparative psychology, 
T. Mann Jones, whose correspondence with Morgan provided an important catalyst for 
Morgan’s experimental turn, and substantially influenced the developmental focus of the 
experimental approach that Morgan ultimately endorsed. 
 In telling this story, we also want to shed light on the intended function of 
Morgan’s Canon, the methodological principle for which Morgan is now mostly known. 
It is our contention that the Canon can only be properly understood by seeing it in the 
context of Morgan’s own unique experimental vision for comparative psychology. 
 
5  
 
2. Morgan’s early scepticism about comparative psychology 
Morgan’s early views about the scope and limits of comparative psychology were boldly 
expressed in a series of articles published in the early-to-mid 1880s.2 The most striking 
and programmatic of these was an article published in Mind in 1886, called “On the study 
of animal intelligence”, which expanded on arguments made in his 1885 book, The 
Springs of Conduct.3 
Morgan began by discussing the sorts of reports of animal intelligence that 
Romanes had collected together in his 1882 book, Animal Intelligence. Romanes had 
described the volume as a compendium of “facts” of animal intelligence, which could 
then be used by researchers to work out the details of how psychology had evolved 
throughout the animal kingdom—something that he tried to do in the follow-up volume, 
Mental Evolution in Animals (1883a). The book presented a wide-ranging survey of what 
Romanes took to be the existing evidence for intelligence in a large variety of animal 
species, from amoeba and molluscs, to elephants and great apes. Like the evidence 
reported by Darwin in The Descent of Man, the “facts” collected in Animal Intelligence 
consisted, for the most part, in anecdotal reports of animal behaviour: recollections of 
chance observations of interesting behaviour communicated to him by correspondents, 
reported in the scientific literature, or recorded by Romanes himself. 
Though Romanes had, by his own account, tried to make the “phenomena of mind 
in animals, having constituted so much and so long the theme of unscientific authors… a 
worthy object of scientific endeavour” (Romanes, 1882a, pVI), Morgan saw serious 
problems in the way that Romanes and his correspondents discussed these interesting 
instances of animal behaviour. The main problem, according to Morgan, was 
disentangling the “facts” from the “inferences” in the reports. Alongside providing 
factual descriptions of the actions of animals in particular circumstances, the witness 
normally also, usually unintentionally, described the situation in such a way that made 
substantive, but undefended, assumptions about the underlying psychology of the animal 
involved. As an example, Morgan discussed a report cited by Romanes of an orangutan 
                                                
2 For biographical details on Morgan, see Morgan (1930), Richards (1987), and Radick (2007). 
3 In a manner not uncommon for philosopher-scientists of the time, Springs of Conduct was a work of 
staggeringly wide scope, featuring discussions of topics ranging from zoology, chemistry, psychology, 
metaphysics, and philosophy of science. The latter was a recurrent theme throughout the book, and is, as 
we will argue, vital to understanding Morgan’s early scepticism about comparative psychology. 
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who untied three knots on a rope that was otherwise too short to be used to reach a key. 
Alongside describing the fact of the orang untying the knots, the witness also described 
the situation as one where the animal recognized “the nature of the obstacle to his 
desires” (Morgan, 1886, p174). This, Morgan claimed, was not an observational fact but 
an inference, and, moreover, one that might not have been made by another witness to the 
same event. Thus, a problem with this kind of anecdotal “evidence” of animal 
intelligence was that the report itself often begged the question about the type of 
psychological process involved. This was clearly not the way to do good science—the 
facts of the case had to be clearly separated from the inferences being made by the 
witness, and differential evidence was needed for making those particular inferences 
rather than others also consistent with the facts. 
But, even when we were clear about what was being observed and what was being 
inferred in these reports, there remained, Morgan argued, a deep epistemological problem 
for comparative psychology. Morgan agreed with Romanes that if a science of the minds 
of other creatures was possible, the primary method of inquiry was what W.K. Clifford 
(1874, 1878) had called “ejective”. Theorizing about the nature of minds other than our 
own was done, first, by introspecting on the causes of our own behaviour under various 
circumstances, so as to reach an understanding of the range of mental processes operative 
in our own minds, and then reasoning by analogy to infer possible causes of similar 
behaviour in the other creature in question. The key problem, for Morgan, was how to 
verify such “ejective” inferences. Experience showed that introspection on one’s own 
psychological workings was often a less than reliable guide to the minds of other human 
beings, especially people from different cultures. Yet, at least with humans, we had the 
possibility of using linguistic communication to check the accuracy of our ejective 
inferences. Thus, “[l]anguage makes possible the social eject; and thus makes possible a 
science of Human (as opposed to Individual) Psychology” (1886, p176).4 Clearly, 
however, this tool was not available when we looked at animals. That, alongside the fact 
that the ejective method could lead different individuals to quite different psychological 
                                                
4 However, even here Morgan argued that there were limits on how much one could know about humans 
living in very different cultures, or even just humans with different class, economic, religious, and 
educational backgrounds to one’s own. Scientific psychology should strictly be seen as holding good “for 
civilised, but not of necessity for uncivilised, folk. It is a psychology of sages, but not of savages” (1886, 
p176). 
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explanations for the same observed behaviour, imposed fundamental limitations on our 
ability to acquire knowledge about the internal psychological workings of animals, and 
since we knew that the reliability of the ejective method must “hold good in diminishing 
degree for minds of successively lower development”, our inferences concerning the 
“motives, minds, and characters” of animals were “so largely liable to error as to render 
the drawing of them unprofitable for purposes of scientific investigation” (1886, p177). 
The early Morgan did not deny that we could be sure that animals had minds. He 
accepted that since they had “inherited brain-structures in many respects similar to those 
possessed by man… there is no reason for supposing that in them no psychoses [changes 
in consciousness] run parallel, or are identical with their neuroses [changes in 
neurophysiology]” (1886, p178). He thus agreed with Romanes that the best evidence for 
animal mentality was documented neurophysiological homology, but he also agreed that 
the paucity of existing neurophysiological knowledge meant that it was the ejective 
method that had to do all the heavy lifting, at least until there were sufficient advances in 
neurobiology. Morgan did seem cautiously optimistic about our knowledge in this area 
increasing, but, given such existing limitations,5 we needed to be realistic about how 
much we could know about the nature of these minds, for not only was our ability to 
verify hypotheses about the nature of the minds of animals impaired by the lack of an 
independent check on the ejective method, the very fact that the primary method of 
inference in comparative psychology was ejective meant that the scope of our 
hypothesizing was also impaired, our interpretations of animal behaviour necessarily 
having to be framed in terms of our own psychology: “[if] we speak of memory, 
sympathy, affection, revenge, etc., as mental qualities possessed by animals, we must 
remember that each of these is stamped with the human image and superscription, and 
bears our own individual mark” (1886, p178). Drawing an analogy, Morgan asked: 
 
Could we frame a science of Astronomy if the only method of procedure were to 
observe the stars and planets in mirrors of varying and unknown curvature? 
Harder still is the task of framing a science of Comparative Psychology out of our 
                                                
5 Though the balance changed over time, this tendency to weigh grounds for scepticism against grounds for 
optimism about the future is a persistent theme throughout Morgan’s writings on comparative psychology, 
and (as a reviewer has suggested to us) perhaps helps to explain why Morgan wrote so much on questions 
of method and proper inference. 
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ejective knowledge of the mental faculties of animals, liable as they are to 
inevitable errors of unknown amount. (1886, p179-180). 
 
All of this meant that the ambitions of comparative psychology had to be 
drastically reined in: instead of aiming to elucidate the nature of the internal mental states 
and processes of animals, as the sort of comparative psychology envisioned by Romanes 
aimed to do, comparative psychologists should rather focus their attentions on “the 
scientific study of the habits and activities of animals” (1886, p180). By this he meant 
studying the behavioural propensities and dispositions of particular animals in various 
circumstances. This could include studying the “[t]he origin and mode of development of 
intelligent, that is specially adaptive actions and individual habits”, “the age at which they 
manifest themselves; if there is any learning in the case”, and “the organic mechanism, 
nervous and other, by means of which the habits and activities are carried” (1886, p185-
186). We could, Morgan argued, form a legitimate science of these objective and 
verifiable aspects of the behaviour of animals, but we should “place the motives (so 
difficult to get at even in the case of our neighbours) on one side, as at present beyond the 
reach of scientific treatment” (1886, p181). Moreover, while Morgan recognized the 
motivations of naturalists attempting to document evidence of psychological continuity 
between humans and animals in order to support the doctrine of mental evolution, he 
argued that loose speculation about “hypothetical motives and complex mental states” 
was “likely to hinder rather than advance the acceptance of the doctrine by all careful 
thinkers” (1886, p182). 
This scepticism was reinforced by Morgan’s worries about the practical 
inapplicability of Romanes’ tripartite taxonomy of psychological faculties. Building on 
the work of other early psychologists—most notably Herbert Spencer’s Principles of 
Psychology (1855, 1870-2)—Romanes argued that behaviour came in three basic kinds: 
reflexive, instinctive, and rational. Reflex action was understood as “non-mental neuro-
muscular adjustment, due to the inherited mechanism of the nervous system” (1882a, 
p17), and always involved “particular adaptive movements to particular stimulations” 
(p3-4). Examples of reflexes included the unconscious withdrawal of an organism’s hand 
or foot from irritation—an adaptation that occurred even when the nerves connecting the 
limbs to the brain were severed (p2-3). Many such actions might appear to be the product 
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of conscious choice, but reflexes involved no such conscious or intentional action. 
Instincts were also adaptations to particular stimuli, but what distinguished them from 
reflexes was the active role of the mind. In characterizing this distinction, Romanes also 
drew a distinction between “sensation” and “perception”. Sensations were very simple 
sensory detections, such as detecting heat or light, or detecting physical contact at a 
particular point on the body. Perceptions, on the other hand, were more complex sensory 
detections, that involved picking out certain features of complex sensory inputs, such as 
detecting the presence of a particular kind of object in a wider visual field. All perception, 
for Romanes, involved “inference” and therefore the presence of a “mental element”. 
Thus, reflexes and instincts could also be distinguished in terms of their initiating stimuli: 
automatic behaviours stimulated by brute sensations were the product of mere reflexes, 
whereas behaviours stimulated by more fine-grained perceptions were the product of 
instincts (1883a, p159-160).6 While instinctive behaviours involved conscious action, 
they did not involve any kind of understanding of what was being done and why, and 
they resulted in behaviours that tended to be shared by all normal members of a species. 
In contrast, reason was the faculty “concerned in the intentional adaptation of means to 
ends”, and implied “conscious knowledge of the relation between means employed and 
ends attained” (p17). “Rational” or “intelligent” behaviours (Romanes used these terms 
interchangeably) were those that were adaptive to unique and comparatively rare 
situations, and were thus displayed by individuals, but not necessarily by all the 
individuals in the species. Romanes thus categorized all instances of individual learning 
from experience of the sort that could explain differences in the behaviours of individual 
members of the same species as instances of reason. It was at this level that truly 
conceptual thought took place. 
While Morgan agreed with the internal logic of Romanes’ taxonomy, it was, he 
argued, “inapplicable in practice”, since it rested on extremely subtle theoretical 
distinctions—such as the difference between conscious and unconscious actions—which 
                                                
6 In light of this role of the “mental element” in instinct, Romanes stressed that learning from experience—
which was widely seen at the time as a crucial criterion for the presence of mind—was only a sufficient, not 
a necessary condition of mindedness. From the fact that “a lowly organised animal does not learn by its 
own individual experience, we may not therefore conclude that in performing its natural or ancestral 
adaptations to appropriate stimuli consciousness, or the mind-element, is wholly absent; we can only say 
that this element, if present, reveals no evidence of the fact” (1882a, p5). Nonetheless, learning did, 
Romanes argued, constitute the clearest behavioural evidence for mindedness. 
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were not easily translatable into observable differences in behaviour. It was impossible to 
tell, for instance, whether or not any allegedly instinctive action was not just a reflex, 
since the role of consciousness could not be directly observed in the behaviour itself. 
Consequently, it was fruitless for psychologists to attempt to pronounce on which of the 
faculties in Romanes’ taxonomy were possessed by animals. As part of his proposal for 
how comparative psychology should be practiced, Morgan thus offered new definitions 
of reflex and instinct in what he took to be “objective”, non-psychological terms: reflex 
actions were “those which are of the nature of organic responses to more or less definite 
stimuli and which involve rather the organs of an organism than the organism as a 
whole”, while instinctive actions were “those which are performed, through the influence 
of inherited habit, by the individual in common with all the members of the same more or 
less restricted group, in adaptation to certain oft-recurring circumstances” (1886, p184).7 
And instead of talking about “reason”, we should talk about “intelligent” actions, which 
were those “performed by the individual, in virtue of his individuality, in special 
adaptation to special circumstances” (1886, p184). While “difficulties” “may arise in the 
application of these definitions” they were at least, “surmountable”, whereas those 
surrounding Romanes “ejective” definitions were “insurmountable” (1886, p184). 
Morgan’s diagnosis of the epistemological problems facing Romanesian 
comparative psychology was not original. Indeed, almost everything that Morgan said in 
setting up these problems could have been quoted from the introductory chapters to 
Romanes’ Animal Intelligence or Mental Evolution in Animals.8 But, while both men 
                                                
7 The reference to “inherited habit” indicates that, at this point in his career, Morgan was happy to accord a 
role to Lamarckian inheritance of acquired characteristics in evolution—something that he became 
increasingly sceptical about as time went on, and which his later experiments with young birds ultimately 
led him reject (Boakes, 1984). 
8 For instance, Romanes highlighted a particular problem for the ejective method when we considered 
insects and other organisms so physiologically different to humans: “The whole organisation of such a 
creature is so different from that of a man that it becomes questionable how far analogy drawn from the 
activities of the insect is a safe guide to the inferring of mental states” (1882a, p9). Nonetheless, the 
ejective method was, he argued, the only one available to us: 
 
The mental states of an insect may be widely different from those of a man, and yet most probably 
the nearest conception that we can form of their true nature is that which we form by assimilating 
them to the pattern of the only mental states with which we are actually acquainted. And this 
consideration, it is needless to point out, has a special validity to the evolutionist, inasmuch as 
upon his theory there must be a psychological, no less than a physiological continuity extending 
throughout the length and breadth of the animal kingdom. (1882a, p10). 
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highlighted exactly the same problems with the ejective method, they were each led to 
very different conclusions: while Romanes remained optimistic about the possibility of a 
genuine science of animal minds—as opposed to a science merely of the habits and 
activities of animals—the early Morgan saw these problems as imposing fundamental 
limits on our ability to know anything substantive about animal psychology. Indeed, 
Morgan’s strategy in the Mind paper was in essence to show how Romanes’ own views 
about the methods of comparative psychology led to a profound scepticism about his 
claims about animals intelligence. 
Finally, as Radick (2000, 2007) has emphasized, Morgan had a theoretical reason 
for denying that animals have reason. Romanes had argued that cats, dogs, and numerous 
other species possessed the ability to entertain abstract ideas of qualities such as redness, 
good for eating, or bad for eating. However, in a letter to Nature in 1882, Morgan 
defended the Lockean doctrine, then promoted most notably by the philosopher and 
Sanskrit scholar F. Max Müller, that the ability to engage in “abstraction”—and with it all 
truly conceptual thought—went hand-in-hand with language: 
 
I believe […] abstract ideas to be impossible for the brute, I believe them to be the 
outcome of the use of language. We see a plum, and we find that it is round, and 
blue, and resisting. From these words we form abstract nouns, roundness, 
blueness, resistance. We then proceed to manufacture a something to which each 
of these words may answer, and we call that something a quality. Having thus 
made the quality, the next thing we do is to try and endow it with a separate 
existence, and to the results of our endeavours we give the name abstract idea. All 
this process which grows out of our use of words under the influence of a 
developed power of reflection… Without a considerably developed use of 
symbols such a process is impossible. Hence I believe that no animal can form an 
abstract idea… (Morgan, 1882, p524).  
 
Thus, not only did the methods of comparative psychology fail to provide a secure basis 
for inferring anything very interesting about the psychological capacities of animals, we 
also had strong theoretical reasons for believing that animals lacked sophisticated forms 
of cognition—specifically, the kinds of abstract conceptual thought distinctive of what 
Romanes and others called “reason”. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Note the role that the theory of evolution, and the psychological continuity it seems to imply, plays in 
justifying the use of the ejective method. 
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 3. From sceptic to proponent 
Morgan’s criticisms of Romanes led to a number of exchanges between the two men. 
Romanes (1884) offered what he regarded as a reductio of Morgan’s arguments: they 
ultimately led to the impossibility of a science of the human mind as well as one of the 
animal mind. In particular, Romanes saw no reason to assume that linguistic 
communication was in fact a reliable check on the ejective method. Hence, since a 
science of the human mind using the ejective method was clearly possible, so was a 
science of the animal mind. 
However, much had changed in Morgan’s attitude towards comparative 
psychology by the time Animal Life and Intelligence appeared in 1890-1. In this work, 
though Morgan often found places to object to Romanes, his tone was one of praise as 
much as criticism. For example, he spoke of Romanes’ “careful and exact observations, 
his patient and thoughtful inferences, and his lucid and often luminous exposition” (1890-
1, p433-434). Most tellingly, however, Morgan’s use of the terms “reflex”, “instinct”, and 
“intelligence” was now much closer to Romanes’ definitions than to his earlier, purely 
behavioural characterizations. 
 In Morgan’s 1886 Mind paper, Romanes was criticized for his references to 
consciousness in the definitions of “instinct” and “intelligence”, on the grounds that 
specific attributions of consciousness to animals could not be objectively verified. 
According to Morgan’s 1890-1 taxonomy of psychological faculties, however, reflex 
actions were “physiological responses to more or less definite stimuli, and which involve 
rather the several organs of the organism than the activities of the organism as a whole” 
(1890-1, p422). Though there was no need to infer that the animal was conscious in order 
to understand reflexive behaviour, such behaviours might nonetheless, Morgan argued, be 
accompanied by consciousness. Instinctive behaviours differed from reflexive ones in 
their being “coordinated activities which are performed […] in adaptation to certain 
circumstances, oft-recurring or essential to the species” (p422-423). Such activities 
included “perfect” instincts, which, for Morgan, included the chick’s ability to accurately 
peck at objects just moments after hatching, and “incomplete” instincts, which required 
some practice and development, but very little learning. Morgan claimed that such 
incomplete instincts or habitual activities were “accompanied by consciousness during 
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the process of their organization and establishment” (p432), but once the behaviours were 
developed, they occurred without or with very little consciousness (p431). Perfect 
instincts, like reflexes, might be accompanied by consciousness, but attributing 
consciousness would be unnecessary for understanding the relevant behaviour. What 
Morgan called “intelligent” actions, on the other hand, most definitely required the 
operation of consciousness. These were behaviours that were learned in adaption to 
special circumstances, and hence peculiar to individual animals. Like Romanes, Morgan 
now thought that learning from experience was a sufficient (but not a necessary) 
behavioural indication of consciousness: “all of these [i.e., reflexes, instincts, and 
intelligence] may be, and the last, the intelligent actions, invariably are, accompanied by 
consciousness” (p432). 
This marked a very significant change in outlook from his earlier work, for, as we 
saw, it was for adopting exactly this sort of psychological approach to framing the 
explanatory posits of comparative psychology (rather than a purely behavioural one) that 
the earlier Morgan criticized Romanes. While this new Morgan was under no illusions 
about the practical difficulties of determining whether particular animal behaviour was 
due to reflex, instinct, intelligence, and so forth, these were perfectly legitimate objects of 
investigation for the comparative psychologist. 
Where the main disagreement existed between Morgan circa 1890 and Romanes 
was the distinction between reason and what Morgan was now calling “intelligence”, and 
whether there was good evidence for reason in animals. Both men understood reason to 
involve the ability to engage in abstract conceptual thought. Creatures endowed with such 
capacity—human beings, for instance—could carve up the world using various concepts 
by which they could think about objects and situations in ways removed from immediate 
sensory experience. However, Romanes tended to regard any instance of individual 
learning from experience as an example of such rational capacity at work. Take the 
example of a dog learning to take the current of a river into account when swimming 
across it. Romanes explained cases like this in terms of the animal having acquired a 
conceptual understanding of the relationship between means and ends—i.e., an explicit 
understanding, independent of immediate sensory experience, of the river current, how it 
affected the path of a swimmer across the river, and thus of the best place to enter the 
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river to get to its desired landing point. Morgan, however, thought that there was a vast 
realm of individual learning from experience that fell short of genuine reason. For 
instance, the dog could, through a process of trial and error, have learned an association 
between entering the water at a particular spot with ending up in the mud and an 
association between entering at a point higher up stream with reaching a more desirable 
landing spot (p364-365). While such trial and error learning certainly required the 
operation of consciousness, it need not involve any abstract conceptual understanding of 
the river current and its effects on a swimmer. It only required what Morgan called the 
“perceptual” capacity to adjust one’s behaviour according to one’s past and current 
perceptions—for instance, to the associations between events that one has observed over 
time. Such instances of non-conceptual learning from experience, Morgan dubbed 
“intelligence”. 
This was a crucial distinction, and one of Morgan’s most important theoretical 
contributions to comparative psychology. Associationist theories of learning had, of 
course, a long pedigree in British philosophy, and earlier psychologists like Alexander 
Bain had been busy trying to understand how such learning might work in the brain (see 
Boakes, 1984). What Morgan was doing, however, was showing how various forms of 
associationist learning could be distinguished from the kind of conceptual, abstract 
understanding of relations that was central to both Romanes and Morgan’s notion of 
reason. With this distinction in hand, Morgan expressed scepticism about Romanes’ 
evidence for reason in animals. In what one might regard as a precursor to his famous 
Canon, he argued that we should “assume that the [the animal’s] inferences are 
perceptual, unless there seem to be well-observed facts which necessitate the analysis of 
the phenomena, the formation of isolates, and therefore the employment of reason” 
(p362-3). Morgan discussed a sampling of the supposed evidence for animal reason, and 
maintained that the there were no grounds to hold in any case that the relevant behaviour 
was the product of more than merely intelligent adjustment of behaviour. 
 Morgan was thus able to retain his theoretical view that language was necessary 
for reason, and hence that language-less animals were bereft of reason. However, his 
discussion of questions of animal mind had quite a different tone to that found in his 
earlier papers. His invoking of the interpretive principle described above, whereby, other 
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things being equal, one was to prefer merely intelligent, perceptual explanations of 
animal behaviour to explanations that involved the attribution of reason and conceptual 
capacity, provides a clear illustration of this. Morgan argued for caution when explaining 
behaviour, but he did not want to give up on theorizing about the internal psychological 
states of animals. To the contrary, he was now quite happy to attribute particular 
behaviours to intelligence (as he now defined it) and other genuinely psychological 
processes.9 
The changes in Morgan’s position were not lost on Romanes. In his 1891 review 
of Animal Life and Intelligence, Romanes observed: “Prof. Morgan has now abandoned 
the extreme scepticism which characterised his writings of some years[…] His criticisms 
now are confined to questioning the validity of inferences in particular cases—such as 
whether activity A on the part of an animal is due to emotion a, or not rather to emotion 
b. So far as these detailed criticisms apply to my own writings […] I willingly allow their 
cogency” (1891, p263-264). 
 
4. Morgan’s developing epistemological views 
In stark contrast to Morgan’s earlier work, Animal Life and Intelligence can therefore be 
seen as an attempt to strengthen Romanes’ project by introducing a clear distinction 
between reason and intelligence, and clearer understanding of what kind of evidence was 
necessary to establish the presence of reason in animals—thus, representing a full 
acceptance of the idea that a genuine science of animal minds was indeed possible. But, 
why exactly did Morgan shift from a position of “extreme scepticism” about the study of 
animal minds to this more optimistic position? 
In his autobiography, Morgan (1930, p237) said that he was introduced to 
philosophy as a youth by the rector of his local parish, who encouraged him to read 
Bishop Berkeley. Richards (1987, p382-385) speculates that it was Morgan’s early 
infatuation with Berkeley’s claims about the fundamental isolation of the individual 
mind—of each person being locked inside their own consciousness—that partly 
motivated his epistemological scepticism about the science of comparative psychology. 
                                                
9 This softening of Morgan’s position is evident in Morgan’s thinking from around 1888 onwards. For 
example, in an unpublished lecture notebook dated 1888-1891 (Conwy Lloyd Morgan Papers, University of 
Bristol Information Services, Special Collections, DM 612). 
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Richards argues that Morgan gradually shifted away from this sceptical stance as his 
monistic views on the mind-body problem developed over the course of the mid-to-late 
1880s (see also Wozniak, 1997). He suggests that three factors converged to bring about 
this shift: first, through their exchanges (see especially, Romanes, 1884), Romanes 
managed to convince Morgan that his sceptical arguments against Romanesian 
psychology could equally apply to human psychology; second, Morgan came to see his 
own idealism as metaphysically excessive. A third factor, Richards argues, was Morgan’s 
experimental research into animal instincts. 
Though we dissent from some aspects of Richard’s account, we agree that 
Morgan underwent an important shift in epistemological outlook coincident with the 
development of his monism, and it was this that encouraged the rapprochement with 
Romanes in Animal Life and Intelligence. In this section, we will draw out the nature of 
the change in epistemological outlook that Morgan had undergone by 1890, and explain 
why this encouraged much greater sympathy to an ejective approach to comparative 
psychology. In particular, we will highlight an aspect of Morgan’s work that has attracted 
very little previous attention: his philosophy of science.10 In the next section, we will 
discuss the impact of Morgan’s experimental work. As we will show, this took Morgan in 
yet another direction, this time away from Romanes, towards a distinctively new vision 
for comparative psychology. 
Though they came in many different varieties, monistic philosophies were all the 
rage in mid-to-late nineteenth century philosophy. At the core of all monistic theories of 
mind and body was a rejection of Cartesian substance dualism, and a rejection of the 
notion that mind and matter could exert causal influence on each other, either in one 
direction or the other. From there, however, monists could go in a variety of different 
directions, including to various kinds of idealism, materialism, and the neutral monism of 
the German polymath, Ernst Mach.11 The kind of monism that Morgan adopted in Animal 
Life and Intelligence was a dual-aspect monism. According to dual-aspect monisms, 
mind and matter were regarded as different phenomenal manifestations of the same 
                                                
10 Kimler (2000) describes some important aspects of Morgan’s philosophy of science. Our account of how 
it fits in with Morgan’s broader intellectual development is rather different to his. 
11 Around the time that Morgan was writing Animal Life and Intelligence, Mach was involved in 
discussions of his own monism in the pages of the new American philosophy journal, The Monist, to which 
Morgan also became a regular contributor. 
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underlying substance (though different dual-aspect theorists provided quite different 
accounts of the nature of this underlying substance). Thus, even though they were 
represented to us differently in experience, the relationship between them was one of 
fundamental identity. Such views had their roots in Spinoza, whose work Morgan had 
also been introduced to by the kindly rector (Morgan, 1930, p238). By the late 1870s, 
some version of dual-aspect monism had been adopted by many of the scientific 
philosophers developing the new sciences of the mind, including Ernst Haeckel, Gustav 
Fechner, and Wilhelm Wündt in Germany, and W.B. Carpenter, George Henry Lewes, 
and W.K. Clifford in Britain.12 The prevailing view amongst these theorists was that 
dual-aspect monism was the only metaphysics that could underwrite a true science of the 
mind, since it allowed that mental and neurological processes could be studied as 
concomitants of each other.13 
Such views were still highly controversial, however, in large part because they 
were frequently associated with obscure speculative accounts of the underlying nature of 
reality. Haeckel and Fechner, for instance, held a rather mystical panpsychism, according 
to which every speck of matter had a mental side to it. Clifford (1874, 1878) caused a stir 
in Britain by arguing that the fundamental substance making up all reality was “mind 
stuff”, unconscious psychical particles, which, when arranged in the form of a complex 
nervous system gave rise to conscious thought, but when the object of sense experience 
were represented as matter. However, like Wündt (to whom Clifford [1878, p87-88] 
compared his own views), Clifford dismissed panpsychism. He argued that consciousness 
                                                
12 Morgan cited both Spinoza and Clifford in Animal Life and Intelligence (Lewes and Haeckel were also 
cited, albeit not in the context of the mind-body problem). He made no mention of Fechner or Wündt, 
instead citing another German, Max Müller, as a key influence on his thinking (1890-1, p467). Morgan did, 
however, use Fechner’s analogy of the concave and convex sides of the same circle to illustrate the 
relationship between mind and body, though both Lewes and Carpenter had also used it. Richards (1987), 
somewhat inaccurately, suggests that Morgan’s monism was similar to the neutral monism defended by 
Mach and William James. For the differences between neutral monism and dual-aspect views, see Mach 
(1886) and James (1905). 
13 Cartesian substance dualism was seen as facing a fundamental problem in accounting for mind-body 
interaction, while Leibnizian psycho-physical parallelism needed to explain how mind and body could be 
synchronized, and materialism was seen as either dismissing mind altogether or demoting it to a merely 
epiphenomenal by-product of neural activity, as on Huxley’s (1874) conscious automata theory. 
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likely only emerged when mind stuff was composed in the form of something like a 
nervous system.14 
As Richards documents, Romanes had also been developing a dual-aspect 
monism during the 1880s, though the path taken was somewhat circuitous. Romanes 
ultimately committed himself to Clifford’s mind stuff theory,15 but remained much more 
open to Fechnerian panpsychism, granting the possibility that, since mind stuff was at the 
root of everything, societies, or even the universe as a whole, may have conscious mental 
states. 
In his 1885 book, The Springs of Conduct, Morgan expressed uncertainty about 
the proper solution to the mind-body problem. Though he regarded what he called 
“materialism”—which he described as the view that conscious mind was simply an 
attribute of certain kinds of matter in motion—as “the practical answer”, perfectly 
adequate for the purposes of the practical man of science, his philosophical leanings were 
towards Clifford’s mind stuff monism. Though he referred to this theory as a kind of 
“idealism”, he recognized that it was not much like the idealism of Berkeley, since the 
ultimate stuff of reality was not conscious thought, and it did not involve regarding talk 
of matter and material objects as a roundabout way of talking about sensory experience 
(he expressed no view on the issue of panpsychism). 
Despite these metaphysical speculations about mind stuff, Springs of Conduct 
presented quite an austere empiricist epistemology when it came to scientific questions. 
The ultimate test of truth in science, Morgan argued, was empirical verification. This 
notion was tied squarely to successful observational prediction, or “prevision”. Rejecting 
Cartesian notions that the ultimate test of truth for ideas about the empirical world was 
the clarity and distinctness of the relevant idea, or the inconceivability of its negation, 
Morgan asked: 
                                                
14 Though they were often less than clear on this point, the scientific dual-aspect monists generally did not 
accept the view attributed to Spinoza, and adopted by British idealists like F.H. Bradley, that the universe 
contained only one particular thing and thus that there could exist no genuine relations between individual 
things. This view, famously criticized by Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore at the turn of the twentieth 
century (partly precipitating the rise of analytic philosophy), was inimical to a science of psychology that 
sought to chart mental and physical relations. 
15 Many of Romanes’ essays on the topic were collected together in a posthumous volume, Mind, Motion, 
and Monism, edited by Morgan (Romanes, 1896). Alongside Clifford, Lewes and Wündt were mentioned 
several times in these essays. 
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[H]ow is it that self-evidence of a fact or the inconceivableness of its negation 
comes to be the test of truth? Surely because throughout all experience, individual 
and ancestral, there has been no contradiction of the fact, no negation of its truth. 
Or, to put it in another way, surely it is simply because prevision has been 
constantly verified? Self-evidence and the inconceivableness of negation are 
simply the organized outcome of experience constantly verified, and only as such 
have they any value as the test of truth for external facts. 
For all practical purposes, I take it, prevision is the most valuable test of 
truth. (1885, p236, emphasis in original). 
 
As an example of the test of prevision at work, Morgan argued that the Darwinian theory 
of common ancestry deserved to be regarded as a true theory because so many of the 
observational predictions deduced from the theory “may be fairly regarded as fulfilled 
predictions; and in this fulfilment of prediction the doctrine of descent stands justified by 
the test of truth” (p250). This particular passage might be taken as evidence that 
Morgan’s philosophy of science was hypothetico-deductivist, in contrast to the prevailing 
inductivism established in nineteenth century British philosophy of science by J.S. Mill, 
John Herschel, and William Whewell. However, Morgan clearly thought that hypotheses 
ought to be grounded in observation before the test of prevision was applied. His views 
remained very much in the inductivist tradition, therefore. 
We submit that it was Morgan’s early, quite austere, empiricist philosophy of 
science, with its emphasis on observational verification as the touchstone of empirical 
justification that, in conjunction with the Cliffordian conception of the ejective method, 
led Morgan to scepticism about the possibility of a science of animal minds. As he stated 
in an earlier part of the book in direct opposition to Romanes: 
 
A science of ejecto-subjective human psychology is therefore possible, because 
you and I and all who are capable of introspection can compare and verify—each 
for himself in his own experience—the results obtained by psychologists. But my 
faithful dog, if he be capable of introspection, cannot convey to me the results at 
which he has arrived. In the psychology of animals no such verification is 
possible, and verification is that which makes science science. (1885, p164-165). 
  
Of course, this epistemological attitude was seemingly just as out of step with the 
Cliffordian “mind stuff” theory to which Morgan expressed sympathy only a few pages 
later—a theory beyond the test of prevision if ever there was one—though, at this point in 
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his career, Morgan did seem happy to accept the legitimacy of speculative metaphysics,16 
and draw a distinction between the methods of science and those of metaphysics. In any 
case, it seems that Morgan did come to regard the mind stuff view as epistemologically 
unfounded, since in Animal Life and Intelligence, he abandoned all speculative claims 
about the nature of the underlying substance of reality, as well as his pragmatic sympathy 
for materialism. Instead, a much more metaphysically modest, but clearly much thought 
over, monism reigned supreme: mind and matter were to be regarded as two aspects of 
“the unknown substance of being—unknown, that is to say, in itself and apart from its 
objective and subjective manifestations” (1890-1, p468). Conceptually, mind and matter 
were both “constructs”: products of the analysis of experience—mind from experiences 
of one’s own consciousness, and matter from sense experience. Neither had greater claim 
to reality than the other. Rather, they were to be regarded as different aspects of the same 
underlying noumenal reality, like the concave and convex sides of the same circle. In a 
Kantian spirit, Morgan argued that this reality was not directly knowable in itself, since it 
could not be an object of perception. However, good grounds did exist for believing in its 
existence and, with it, in the reality of both “matter” and “mind”. 
Morgan’s primary argument for monism was that it led to “the most consistent 
and harmonious results” (p469). In keeping with his core commitment to empiricism, 
Morgan repeatedly emphasized that the grounds for all knowledge was experience and 
rejected the view that monism was to be based on a priori metaphysical speculation. 
Rather, all philosophies had to rest on certain assumptions—no theory of reality or 
knowledge could be built without assumptions of some sort. The question was which set 
of assumptions enabled us to produce the most coherent overall picture that was 
consistent with experience. Quoting T.M. Herbert, Morgan argued against materialism on 
the grounds that it faced a fundamental problem in accounting for mental causation. The 
idea that mind was a simply by-product of certain types of neural activity suggested that 
mental activity itself played no causal role in human behaviour, and that (in Herbert’s 
words) “the actions, words and gestures of every individual of the human race would 
have been exactly what they have been in the absence of mind” (p471). But, that was an 
                                                
16 At the beginning of the section in which Morgan defended the mind stuff theory, he quoted Goethe: 
“Man must always in some sense cling to the belief that the unknowable is knowable, otherwise speculation 
would cease” (1885, p208). 
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“absurdity”, particularly since it implied that mind could have had no influence on the 
course of organic evolution.17 Idealism led to a similar lack of harmony with experience: 
“The world we live in is a world of phenomena; and it has a phenomenal reality every 
whit as valid as the noumenal reality which underlies it” (p474). Regarding the world of 
material objects as nothing more than states of consciousness was therefore just as out of 
sync with experience as regarding states of consciousness as mere by-products of 
material processes. 
This left us with monism. Morgan followed Clifford in rejecting panpsychism and 
claims of a society- or world-eject as unwarranted, since our knowledge of consciousness 
was limited to it being “the metakinetic [mental] concomitant of a highly specialized 
order of kinesis [physical activity]”, namely something like the “molecular processes” in 
the human brain (p467). However, he made no mention of mind stuff, and was distinctly 
unwilling to speculate about the nature of the noumenal things in themselves at the root 
of the two sides of mind and matter. Experience gave us reason to believe in a noumenal 
reality, but no grounds for claims about its intrinsic nature. 
Though opposition to pure metaphysical speculation can be found throughout 
Morgan’s writings—in his 1887 paper, “The generalisations of science”, for instance, 
Morgan came very close to a Humean account of natural laws—Morgan was here 
becoming more consistently anti-metaphysical, befitting his empiricist heritage. 
However, as the structure of his argument for monism demonstrates, while, on the 
metaphysical front, Morgan’s empiricism had become more conservative, in his 
philosophy of science, Morgan’s empiricism had become much less austere. The notion 
of what Morgan called “congruity” in systems of ideas had attained great epistemological 
importance for him as a test of truth, in addition to direct empirical verification. To 
appreciate this change more fully, we need to look at his theory of cultural evolution. 
The argument for monism was presented in the first half of the last chapter of 
Animal Life and Intelligence, entitled “Mental Evolution”. The second half of the chapter 
was concerned with a different problem: how to account for the evolution of human 
                                                
17 Here, T.H. Huxley’s modus ponens was Morgan’s modus tollens: while Huxley had embraced the idea of 
humans and animals simply being conscious automata as a consequence of the kind of view that Morgan 
called “materialism”, Morgan saw this as a reductio of the materialist view. Romanes (1882b) had also 
given causal-evolutionary arguments of this kind against materialism, following Clifford (1874) and James 
(1879).  
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culture and ideas. Morgan held that natural selection could not have played a significant 
role in the development of human culture since many of our thoughts, concepts, and 
ideas—particularly aesthetic and scientific ones—were “unassociated with life-preserving 
and life-continuing activities” (p485). “It matters not how a man explains the lightning’s 
flash”, Morgan argued, “so long as he avoids being struck” (p483). Rather, a different 
kind of evolutionary process was required, which he went on to elucidate. Cultural 
evolution, Morgan argued, was driven by a basic psychological law built into the 
individual human mind: that individuals accept or reject an idea according to how 
“congruous” or “incongruous” it is with the individual’s internal mental environment—
i.e., with “the system of ideas that among which it is introduced” (p486). It was against 
this internal mental environment that particular ideas were selected or eliminated in the 
individual mind, and since the conceptions of “a tribe, nation, or other community, are 
simply representative, either of the general views of the majority of the individuals, or 
more frequently of a majority among a cultivated minority” (p486-7), the same process 
could be used to explain the evolution of systems of ideas at these higher levels.18 
Because the creative ability of human beings to produce new ideas led to natural 
variation, and because there were many possible ways to make systems of ideas internally 
congruous, the diversity of human cultures was fully explicable. 
Importantly, Morgan proposed “the law of congruity” as a test for truth in both a 
psychological and a normative sense: not only was it the principle of mental selection at 
work in the human mind that could explain human cultural evolution, it was also to be 
seen as a normative epistemological principle that ought to guide all human investigation, 
including both science and philosophy. Crucially, Morgan argued, “[o]nly one 
interpretation of nature can be true”: 
 
                                                
18 Since Morgan’s monism required that psychological and neurological processes be but two aspects of the 
same underlying process, Morgan highlighted what he regarded as the neurological concomitant of the 
psychological process of selection by congruity and elimination by incongruity: “Just as no idea can get 
itself accepted if it be in incongruity with the system of ideas among which it is introduced, so too, can no 
neural process become established if it be not in harmony with the other neural processes of the cerebral 
hemispheres…the environment of any neural process is constituted by other neural processes” (p490-491, 
emphasis in original). Though science currently lacked the ability to distinguish “[t]he brains of Kaffir and 
Boer, of ploughboy and merchant, of materialist and idealist”, their cultural and ideological differences 
must nonetheless, Morgan argued, be accompanied by neurological differences. 
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[T]he winning species among systems of ideas and interpretations of nature are 
those in which the greatest number of ideas are fused into harmonious synthesis; 
in which all the ideas are congruous, few or non neutral; and in which the abstract 
or conceptual ideas, when brought into contract with concrete or perceptual states 
of consciousness, are found to be in harmony and congruity therewith. (1890-1, 
p493-494). 
 
Thus, though the search for congruity had the potential to lead to great diversity, and the 
elimination of the false was “a slow and gradual process”, taken to its fullest extent, the 
process would lead to us the truth. The key epistemic anchor here was congruity with 
perception, and it was this that set apart the interpretation of nature provided by science 
from that of other, more primitive systems of ideas. While other systems may achieve a 
high degree of internal congruity, science obtained epistemic superiority in virtue of both 
internal congruity and greater congruity with the results of observation. 
 Morgan developed these epistemological ideas further in a follow up paper 
entitled, “The law of psychogensis”, published in Mind in 1892. Here, Morgan also 
advocated congruity as “the law of right”, that is to say, as a principle for deciding among 
different ethical beliefs. Morgan’s epistemology was therefore now decidedly naturalistic, 
in that the methods of philosophy were to be continuous with the methods of science. He 
also chastised what he called the “metaphysical mind”, for failing to see the importance 
of congruity with perception. 
In his normative claims, Morgan was by no means recanting his commitment to 
empiricism. Rather, he was now explicitly articulating a more sophisticated form of 
empiricism, echoing some familiar, albeit still controversial themes in mid-to-late 
nineteenth century philosophy of science. William Whewell (1858) had advocated 
“coherence” as a test for truth in scientific theorizing, in addition to successful prediction. 
Whewell’s notion of “consilience”—of multiple different lines of evidence leading one to 
the same conclusion—was connected with this idea. Kimler (2000) notes the influence 
that the notion of consilience had had on British evolutionists, most notably Darwin in his 
thinking about, and presentation of, the nature of the evidence for evolution by natural 
selection. Coherence as a test of truth was also central to the logic of F.H. Bradley (1883) 
(though Bradley’s broader epistemological and metaphysical views were far removed 
from Morgan’s empiricism), and such views seem to have been widespread in monist 
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circles—the editor of The Monist, Paul Carus, advocated a similar test of truth to 
Morgan’s in a paper entitled, “The criterion of truth” (1891). The fact that Morgan’s view 
was part of a broader evolutionary epistemology made his contribution much more 
original, however—making it even more of shame that Morgan’s work in this area has 
been almost entirely forgotten. 
One shouldn’t see this emphasis on congruity or coherence as completely new in 
Morgan’s work. Echoes of it can be found in his earlier work, including his discussion of 
the evidence for evolution by natural selection in The Springs of Conduct. Moreover, at 
least since his earliest interactions with Huxley at the Royal School of Mines (see 
Richards, 1987), Morgan had been steeped in the Darwinian argument style. However, 
these notions were now receiving much greater and more explicit emphasis in his writing, 
and the philosophy of science he was now articulating stands in stark contrast to the more 
austere verification-centred approach he explicitly presented in Springs of Conduct, 
which infused his sceptical discussion of comparative psychology. 
It is easy to see how this more sophisticated form of empiricism could be much 
friendlier to attributions of particular psychological processes to animals as part of a 
search for most “congruous” explanation for behaviour. One did not need direct 
observational verification to take particular psychological explanations of animal 
behaviour seriously. Indeed, in later work, Morgan (1899) suggested that psychology 
faced no greater epistemological problems than physics—quite a reversal from his earlier 
pessimism about the problem of other minds. 
 
5. Morgan’s experimental turn 
Though there were significant theoretical differences between Morgan and Romanes, 
methodologically, Animal Life and Intelligence, was very much in the Romanesian mold. 
Morgan urged caution in the interpretation of anecdotal evidence and expressed 
scepticism about the existence of reason in animals, but, like Romanes, Morgan mostly 
seemed to accept the view that comparative psychology was a largely theoretical 
endeavour, best served by making clear distinctions between different psychological 
processes, and attempting to provide a grand synthesis of all the behavioural data 
available, which, for the most part, remained in the form of anecdotal reports. Hence, the 
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method was one not too different from the method of Darwin and other naturalists of the 
period. 
However, soon after the publication of the book, Morgan began to specify, and 
carry out, an approach that was quite different to the Romanesian one. In his 1892 paper, 
“The Limits of Animal Intelligence” (1892c),19 Morgan reiterated his theoretical view 
about the dependency of “reason” on language, and explained that it was because of this 
that he strongly suspected that animals must therefore lack reason. However, as he had in 
Animal Life and Intelligence, and in stark contrast to the Morgan of the 1880s—who had 
asserted that the ascription of reason to language-less animals was an elementary 
category error, and, in any case, not something that could be defended on empirical 
grounds—in this paper, the issue of whether or not reason was exclusive to humans and 
fundamentally tied to language was definitely not one to be settled a priori, nor was it 
beyond the epistemic reach of science. But, unlike in Animal Life and Intelligence, 
Morgan was now much more specific about the kind of empirical approach he thought 
should be adopted in order to settle this important question:  
 
I have conducted from time to time experiments with the object of ascertaining 
how far there is evidence in the dog of true cognition—of causation for example. I 
am inclined to believe as a result of my observations that there is nothing beyond 
a simple awareness of the causal nexus. But I am far from wishing to dogmatize in 
the matter. I am chiefly concerned that the phenomena should be carefully 
observed, and that experiments should be conducted on definite scientific lines. 
(1892c, p417). 
 
Here, Morgan clearly came out as an optimist about the ability of a science of animal 
minds to get at the nature of the psychological causes of behaviour through careful 
experimentation. The question of whether a legitimate science of comparative psychology 
was possible was not at issue here; it was taken for granted that such a science was indeed 
possible. Moreover, this was a science not just of the externally manifested “habits” and 
“activities” of animals, but of the actual psychology underlying such behaviours—thus, 
the question of whether or not animals were actually capable of reason (“true cognition”) 
                                                
19 This paper was a response to commentary on his address to the 1892 International Congress of 
Experimental Psychology (Morgan, 1892a), in which Morgan first presented the Canon. 
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was one that could be addressed through “accurate, and, as far as possible, crucial 
experiment and observation” (ibid). 
 This interest in experimentation was not entirely new. For example, one of 
Morgan’s early forays into comparative psychology was a series of papers published in 
1883, reporting a variety of experiments that challenged the common belief that scorpions 
in distress would commit suicide by stinging themselves (1883a,b,c). Romanes reported 
apparent instances of this behaviour in Animal Intelligence, but stated that the reports 
“demand further corroboration” (1882, p225). Morgan noted that such apparently 
maladaptive behaviour was all the more interesting as it could be seen as challenging the 
theory of evolution by natural selection. Working in South Africa at the time, Morgan 
thus performed a series of methodical, but gruesome experiments, to test the accuracy of 
these reports (1883a,b,c). First, he used slides to focus light on the scorpion’s back, 
burning the scorpion. While the scorpions subjected to this procedure inevitably died, it 
was not from stinging themselves, but from burning to death (1883a, p20). Other methods 
included slowly heating the scorpion in a bottle, surrounding a scorpion with fire, burning 
phosphorous on their backs, and exposing them to sulphuric acid (ibid, p21-22).20 In no 
case did a scorpion ever commit suicide. 
 The work with scorpions clearly indicates an early belief that experimentation 
could provide important information about animal behaviour—in this case, whether a 
widely reported behaviour did in fact occur. However, the early Morgan notably did not 
use such experiments to make claims about the psychological qualities underlying the 
relevant behaviour. Consistent with the sentiments of the 1886 Mind paper, the emphasis 
was purely on studying the external aspects of the behaviour (“suicide” was defined 
purely in terms of self-stinging, not in terms of underlying motivation, for instance). 
When Morgan later changed his mind about the epistemic tractability of the ejective 
method, experimental results did become relevant to inferring psychological processes. 
For instance, Spalding’s (1873) developmental experiments on the instincts of chicks 
played an important role in Morgan’s discussion of instinct in Animal Life and 
                                                
20 The gruesomeness of the experiments apparently provoked outrage amongst some of his correspondents. 
In response, Morgan appealed to the gravity of the scientific question at hand: “But is the Theory of Natural 
Selection of sufficient importance in its bearing upon human life and human progress to justify the 
infliction of pain upon, say, sixty scorpions? I am one of those who believe that it is” (1883c, p530). 
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Intelligence (more on this shortly). Morgan also cited John Lubbock’s (1777, 1882) 
behavioural experiments with ants and other social hymenoptera, and reported some 
experiments of his own (see, e.g., Morgan, 1890-1, p352). However, at this point, 
Morgan’s references to experimental work were, like those of Romanes, largely in the 
form of cursory asides, discussing interesting observations that had to be accommodated 
into a bigger picture, alongside a mass of anecdotal evidence. Sustained experimental 
work was certainly not picked out as a primary mode of investigation.21 In the years 
immediately after the appearance of Animal Life and Intelligence, however, Morgan came 
to advocate a thorough-going experimental, and, particularly, developmental, approach to 
answering the big questions in comparative psychology. 
 In an essay also titled “The Limits of Animal Intelligence”, published in 1893, 
Morgan returned to the theoretical differences between “instinct”, “intelligence”, and 
“reason”, with reference to a series of experiments he had conducted with newly hatched 
chicks. Once again, Morgan followed Romanes rather than his earlier self by framing 
these notions in psychological rather than purely behavioural terms. For example, in 
distinguishing between “intelligence” and “reason”, Morgan invoked the notion of 
consciousness: 
 
[F]or intelligence it is sufficient that what we call the relationships of natural 
objects should be felt on the margin of consciousness, inalienably associated with 
the objects themselves, while for reason it is necessary that relationships should 
be so far dissociated from the objects as to occupy the focus of consciousness. 
(1893, p233).  
 
                                                
21 Romanes’ attitude towards experimental work was remarkably ambivalent. He also reported Spalding’s 
and Lubbock’s work, along with some rudimentary experiments of his own. However, he doubted that such 
controlled experimental investigation of animal behaviour had much capacity to inform us about the minds 
of animals: 
 
[I]n the science of psychology, nearly all the considerable advances which have been made, 
have been made, not by experiment, but by observing mental phenomena and reasoning from 
these phenomena deductively. […] No one can regret more than myself that the most 
interesting of all regions of scientific enquiry should happen to be the one in which 
experiment, or inductive verification, is the least of all applicable.  (1883a, p12). 
 
As Boakes (1984) notes, this scepticsm about experimental methods in comparative psychology stands in 
interesting contrast to Romanes’ own pioneering experimental work in physiology and embryology 
(Romanes, 1880, 1883b). 
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Morgan’s experiments concerned the development of various pecking behaviours 
in chicks. Morgan kept the chicks in an incubator in his study without any contact with 
adult birds, and recorded his observations of them over the course of several days after 
hatching. Against the prevailing view—the one that he had himself advocated in Animal 
Life and Intelligence, on basis of Spalding’s results—that the chicks’ pecking 
behaviours—such as their ability to peck accurately at food and to discriminate between 
“a nice [tasting] worm and a nasty [tasting] caterpillar” (1893, p234)—were entirely 
innate and purely instinctive, Morgan argued that such behaviours in fact developed with 
the guidance of intelligence. For instance, though the chicks seemed to automatically 
peck at things immediately after hatching, they did not skilfully seize and swallow pieces 
of food at first, but had to refine their skills over time. They also had to learn to avoid 
“nasty” caterpillars and prefer “nice” worms by tasting them first. In such cases, Morgan 
argued, “we have in elementary form the basis of intelligent adaption to circumstances”. 
The latter case, in particular, “involves the association of impressions and ideas; and it 
implies a power of control over the motor responses” (p234). 
In the Introduction to Comparative Psychology, published a year later, Morgan 
reported the results of these and other similar experiments he had conducted, emphasizing 
the importance of such “systematic and sustained” observations of animal behaviour, 
even if their results might run against conventional wisdom or the impressions one got 
from more casual observation: 
 
I would, however, urge on all those who have the good fortune to witness the 
performance of some conspicuously intelligent action in any animal, not to rest 
content with merely recording it, but to make it the basis of further observation 
direct to the end of ascertaining its true nature. The records of casual observation 
are not without their interest; but the result of detailed investigation are, for 
comparative psychology, of far greater value. (1894c, pxii). 
 
Such calls were repeated many times throughout the book, with Morgan frequently 
claiming that behavioural experiment should be the key investigative tool for comparative 
psychology: the central questions in the field, such as whether animals are capable of 
truly conceptual thought, “will have to be settled, if [they] can be settled at all… by 
carefully conducted experimental observations, carried out as far as possible under nicely 
controlled conditions” (1894c, p359). 
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A key point of emphasis, for Morgan, was studying the developmental trajectory 
of particular behaviours (as he had with the chicks), since it was “quite impossible to get 
at the true psychological import of a complex and nicely adapted activity, unless we 
know something of its embryonic stages” (1894c, p251). Observing a skill only in its 
fully developed state—such as a dog using its head to open a latched gate, or a chick 
pecking at food with near perfect accuracy—could mislead us about the true nature of the 
behaviour—for instance, that it was product of reason, when it was actually the result of 
countless instances of trial and error, or a perfect instinct, when it was actually guided by 
intelligence. It was for this reason that Morgan advocated abandoning the practice of 
merely recording interesting chance observations of behaviour and instead carrying out 
intensive studies of animal behaviour over prolonged periods of time, and, as far as 
possible, manipulating various factors that may influence both the performance and 
development of behaviour. If researchers did this, Morgan argued, we would “gain a 
better acquaintance with the psychological processes in animals than we could gain by a 
thousand anecdotes” (1894c, p291).22 “In zoological psychology”, Morgan wrote, “we 
                                                
22 Morgan’s emphasis on carefully conducted experimental studies of behavioural development shouldn't be 
read as exclusively a call for highly interventive experiments of the sort he conducted with the chicks. He 
was also an advocate of more “hands off” observational studies, like those that he conducted with his dog, 
Tony (1894c, p287-290), into the genesis of Tony’s ability to open a latched gate with his head. Here, it 
sufficed simply to conduct careful observation of the acquisition of the behaviour over time in order to 
establish that it was a product of trail-and-error learning (intelligence), rather than reason (e.g., a conceptual 
understanding of the workings of the latch). Indeed, Morgan (1898) later criticized many of Thorndike’s 
(1898) experiments for being overly interventive and artificial, anticipating the concerns of later ethologists 
about the ecological validity of much laboratory work in comparative psychology: 
 
The conductions of his experiments were perhaps not the most conducive to the discovery of 
rationality in animals if it exist [sic]. The sturdy and unconvinceable advocate of reasoning 
(properly so-called) in animals may say that to place a starving kitten in the cramped confinement 
of one of Mr Thorndike’s box cages, would be more likely to make a cat swear than to lead it to 
act rationally. And he may further urge that where the string passes out of sight and the bolt is 
hidden from view, the opportunities of understanding the situation are excluded… But although I 
do not deem Mr Thorndike’s method so conclusive for the anti-rationalist view as observation 
under more natural, and, I may add, more sympathetic conditions, yet the form of his curves 
affords no particle of evidence for reasoned behaviour. (Morgan, 1898, p249). 
 
There is a direct parallel here with Morgan’s criticisms of Romanesian comparative psychology: just as the 
anecdotal reports collected by Romanes and others failed to provide adequate evidence for attributions of 
reason to animals, so Thorndike’s unnatural puzzle box experiments failed to provide fully adequate 
evidence for a denial of reason to animals. Morgan’s call for experimental methods in comparative 
psychology was thus also a call for experiments that were actually capable of revealing (rather than 
inhibiting) the natural abilities of animals. 
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have got beyond the anecdotal stage, we have reached the stage of experimental 
investigation” (1894c, p291). 
In this respect, Morgan’s methodological rhetoric was quite different to that of 
Animal Life and Intelligence, which was very much in “the anecdotal stage”. 
 
6. The influence of Mann Jones 
Morgan’s turn towards an experimental vision for comparative psychology can be seen in 
the context of wider trends in biology and psychology of the period towards experimental 
methods. This was a time when important evolutionary questions, such as questions about 
the nature of inheritance—the tenability of Lamarckian inheritance of acquired 
characteristics, in particular—were starting to be addressed with various experimental 
techniques. In an 1892 review of the French biologist, Henry De Varigny’s Experimental 
Evolution, Morgan praised Romanes—who had himself done pioneering experimental 
work in physiology and embryology (e.g., Romanes, 1880, 1883b)—for calling for an 
institution of experimental biology where one could conduct experiments “testing 
evolution hypotheses in all their bearings” (1892b, p25). Morgan added that such an 
institution should also include a “special branch” dedicated to the “experimental 
investigations in comparative psychology” (ibid). In the same review, Morgan also 
referenced the new marine laboratories that were springing up, where important 
embryological and neurobiological work was being done, and in “The scope of psycho-
physiology”, published in 1894, Morgan referenced the new experimental work in 
psycho-physiology being done in Germany23 and the United States. He noted that except 
for “Galton’s valuable psychometric observations” (Morgan, 1894b, p505), Britain was 
falling behind when it came to experimental work in psychology, and called for more 
work to be done along these lines in comparative psychology. Moreover, his call in the 
Introduction for comparative psychology to reach “the stage of experimental 
investigation” also suggests that Morgan had come to regard the use of experimental 
methods as a hallmark of a maturing science. Hence, the move to experiment seemed a 
                                                
23 The psycho-physiologists Fechner and Weber were mentioned by name earlier in the article. Wündt, who 
had set up the first psychological laboratory in 1873, was not, but Morgan was most likely aware of at least 
some of his work, if only through Romanes. 
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natural part of Morgan’s more general call for comparative psychology to professionalize 
itself. 
However, an additional impetus for Morgan’s turn towards experiment had come 
by way of a friend, who had a crucial influence on the character of Morgan’s particular 
experimental vision. Shortly after publishing Animal Life and Intelligence, Morgan 
received a letter, which offered experimental evidence against the claims that he had 
made in the book on the basis of Spalding’s work. For instance, Spalding had claimed 
that young turkeys innately recognized and became fearful when they heard the cry of a 
hawk, supposedly indicating some degree of innate knowledge, or innate associations. 
Morgan had concluded that chicks “come into the world prepared at once to perform 
complex activities” (1890-1, p424). The correspondent, T. Mann Jones, described the 
results of his own experiments, which ran against many of Spalding’s findings. In 
particular, Mann Jones argued that Spalding’s claim about the instinctive knowledge of 
young turkeys was “an unwarrantable assumption” (Morgan, 1894c, pxi). It was this 
letter that prompted Morgan’s own chick experiments and provided an important catalyst 
and influence on his experimental vision for comparative psychology. 
Little is known about Mann Jones and most commentators pass over him.24 He 
lived in Northam, Devon, and from 1865 to 1870 studied metallurgy at the Royal School 
of Mines (which Morgan also attended from 1871 to 1874). He was a Fellow of the 
Geological Society, and a Fellow of the Linnean Society of London. The Register of the 
Associates and Old Students of the Royal School of Mines and History of the Royal 
School of Mines (Reeks, 1920) also notes he had been a “professor of Chemical and 
Physical Sciences in the Oxford and Woolwich Common Military Colleges”, and that he 
“engaged in research upon the Mind in Animals”. The only publication listed in this 
register is a note published as Appendix D to Spencer’s Justice (1892). He also published 
a variety of short letters and notices in journals, and his experiments are discussed not 
only by Morgan and Spencer, but also in Mills’ The Nature and Development of Animal 
                                                
24 Boakes (1984, p34) does note that Jones encouraged Morgan to approach Spalding’s findings with 
caution, and Gray (1963, p336) notes the importance of Jones’ influence, going so far as to say that were it 
not for Jones’ influence on Morgan in questioning Spalding, there would have been no Thorndike. 
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Intelligence (1898), which includes a letter from Jones detailing experiments he 
performed with young chicks in 1872 and 1873. He died in 1899.25 
Morgan first mentioned Mann Jones in the review of de Varigny’s Experimental 
Evolution for Nature (1892b). De Varigny claimed that kittens are afraid of dogs the first 
time they smelled them. This view was supported by Spalding’s earlier experiments, but 
Morgan doubted such claims: “a careful observer, Mr. Mann Jones, writes to me that a 
young kitten with which he experimented ‘took eight days to connect the smell or odour 
of his hand with the thing—dog’” (p25). Morgan then noted that his own observations 
supported the claims of Mann Jones. 
In 1894, Morgan again credited Mann Jones for using developmental experiments 
to challenge the received view concerning a variety of animal behaviours in two separate 
publications: “Instinct and Intelligence in Chicks and Ducklings” and “The Scope of 
Psycho-Physiology”. In the former, Morgan noted that Mann Jones’ observations were 
contrary to Spalding’s celebrated findings: 
 
In my Animal Life and Intelligence I quoted some of Spalding’s statements as to 
the intelligence of young birds. I then received a letter from my friend, Mr. T. 
Mann Jones, informing me of observations of his own which did not accord with 
those which I quoted, and expressing some scepticism as to the existence of what 
he termed “the philosopher’s chick.” I therefore determined to observe for myself, 
and the following paper contains some account of my observations[…] I desire to 
express my acknowledgments to Mr. Mann Jones for his suggestions and 
criticisms. (1894a, p207). 
 
In the “The scope of psycho-physiology”, Morgan credited Mann Jones for convincing 
him of the value of the experiments for comparative  psychology:   
 
Observations which I have made on newly-hatched chicks and ducklings 
stimulated thereto by suggestions from my friend Mr. T. Mann Jones, have 
convinced me that there is a wide field for careful experimental work on the 
instincts and the dawning phases of intelligence in young animals. We must 
employ the experimental method if we would make further advance in the study of 
the mental faculties of animals. Is it too much to hope that the time is not far 
distant when there shall be established in England chairs of zoological and 
experimental psychology, the occupants of which shall have the direction of 
                                                
25 We are thankful to Wendy Cawthorne of the Geological Society for providing us with the date of Mann 
Jones’ death. 
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adequately equipped laboratories wherein systematic observations, on the lines I 
have indicated above may be conducted? (1894b, p505, emphasis added). 
 
One might be tempted to write off Mann Jones’ influence as a slight correction to 
Morgan’s previous views. This would be a mistake. As the passage just quoted indicates, 
Morgan’s interest in Mann Jones’ experiments extended beyond simple corrections of 
facts about the instincts of kittens and chicks; these kinds of observations were central to 
Morgan’s evolving ideas about how questions in comparative psychology could be 
answered, and it is particularly noteworthy that Morgan followed up his 
acknowledgement of Mann Jones with the call for the establishment of “chairs of 
zoological and experimental psychology”. 
The early Morgan had called for comparative psychologists to study the “[t]he 
origin and mode of development of intelligent, that is specially adaptive actions and 
individual habits” (1886, p185-186), yet this what not seen as capable of telling us very 
much about the nature of the mental faculties behind the external behaviour. Mann Jones’ 
experiments had shown Morgan how the study of behavioural development could indeed 
allow researchers to positively discover the role of consciousness and other internal 
psychological states, and, with it, how one could make definite progress on the big 
questions in comparative psychology. For example, with Mann Jones, Morgan argued 
that the pecking behaviours of chicks, which Spalding had claimed to be innate, were not 
the products of “instinctive knowledge” but were the products of “conscious control” 
(1894a, p213). In a similar vein, Morgan also came to see how detailed study of 
behavioural development could be used to answer the question of animal reason, such as 
whether it was because of the operation reason or mere intelligence (trial and error 
learning) that a dog learned to open a latched gate. Experiments to this effect, conducted 
on Morgan’s own dog, Tony, were reported in the Introduction (1894c, p287-290). Here, 
Morgan emphasized that it might initially seem impossible to decide between rational and 
merely intelligent explanations for this behaviour. However, “when we know the whole 
history of it” (1894c, p290, emphasis in original), the question was much more tractable, 
and it was indeed possible to show that Tony’s trick was the product of intelligence and 
not reason. 
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Mann Jones’ experiments were therefore important not just because they 
challenged the prevailing view about animal instincts; they showed Morgan how 
comparative psychology could progress beyond largely theoretical, synthesizing 
discussions of the sort found in Romanes’ work, while directly challenging Romanes’ 
scepticism of the value of experiments for understanding animal minds, and led Morgan 
to place great emphasis on the study of the development of behaviour.26 In his review of 
de Varigny, Morgan wrote, “such observations [i.e., Mann Jones and Morgan’s own] lead 
me to look with suspicion on any arguments for the transmission of acquired characters 
based on supposed instinctive knowledge of things. And they show the need of further 
research in comparative psychology as could be carried out at the Institute of 
Experimental Biology” (p25). This hypothetical “Institute of Experimental Biology”, 
Morgan envisioned, was the kind of place where an experimental comparative 
psychology could flourish.27 
Nevertheless, though Morgan was here moving away from the Romanesian 
approach to comparative psychology, the new approach was compatible with the ejective 
method. In the Introduction, Morgan presented his mature account of how comparative 
psychology ought to be practiced. There, he made clear how one could marry the ejective 
method with experimental methods to determine whether or not a behaviour was 
instinctive, intelligent, or guided by reason. It is within this context that his famous 
Canon is to be understood. 
 
                                                
26As Boakes (1984) notes, from a methodological perspective, Morgan’s experiments—the chick 
experiments, in particular—now seem very crude, and Morgan (along with Mann Jones) seems to have 
misunderstood many of Spalding’s claims, including the pioneering idea that the development of particular 
instinctive behaviours might depend on a critical period during which a stimulus must be presented. 
27 Morgan’s reference to “the Institute of Experimental Biology”, as well as his earlier quoted call for the 
establishment of “chairs of zoological and experimental psychology” in England, also indicates that he was 
deeply aware of the fact that there was very little by way of institutional support for the kind of research he 
was envisioning, certainly not in Britain. Like Spalding and Mann Jones, Morgan was an amateur 
experimentalist, conducting his work at home. What Morgan was envisioning required much more than the 
part-time efforts of gentleman scientists, or even of those like him with traditional university positions. It 
required institutes and laboratories with both the physical and financial resources necessary to keep large 
numbers of animals in the right kinds of conditions. Similar calls were being made in the US by early 
ethologists, like Whitman (see Burkhart, 1999). As Andrew Wilson (2002) has documented, that 
institutional support did not materialize in Britain, and thus, by the turn of the twentieth century, British 
experimental research in comparative psychology had lost any impetus it had thanks to Morgan’s work. In 
the US, institutional support did eventually come for research in comparative psychology, but it was not for 
the kind of approach that Morgan envisioned. 
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7. A new method for comparative psychology  
In the preface to the Introduction, Morgan credited several researchers to whom he felt 
indebted. He mentioned that his views about reason and the perception of relations were 
based on the work of Herbert Spencer, and that he “borrows” William James’ conception 
of consciousness (px). As for Romanes, he wrote that he “ow[ed] much, and in many 
ways.” In a footnote, Morgan lamented: “The death of Professor Romanes, since this too 
brief acknowledgment of all that I owe him was written and printed, has entailed a loss to 
Science which is irreparable, and a loss to his personal friends which lies too deep for 
words” (px). Morgan then noted that various experimental results had changed his views 
on the development of putatively instinctive behaviour, and emphasized the importance 
of these sorts of “systematic and sustained” observations of animal behaviour for the 
future progress of comparative psychology. Once again, he noted that he had reported 
some of Spalding and Eimer’s work on instinct in Animal Life and Intelligence, and 
recounted how, after receiving a letter from T. Mann Jones and repeating Jones’ 
experiments, he came to doubt the findings of Spalding and Eimer. Morgan noted that he 
did not report all of Mann Jones’ findings because he hoped that Mann Jones would 
publish them himself (pxiii)—which, it seems, Mann Jones never did. 
Besides the emphasis on experimental over anecdotal observation, Morgan also 
emphasized the role of introspection in comparative psychology. However, Morgan 
worried that those studying comparative psychology were not well trained in its use: 
 
It must not be forgotten that introspective psychology is an essential preliminary 
to comparative psychology, and that, if it is to produce results of scientific value, 
it must be based upon exact and oft-repeated observation. Such observation, 
however, requires special training, not less than objective observation in physics 
or in biology. It would be an inestimable boon to comparative psychology, if all 
those who venture to discuss the problems with which this science deals would 
submit to some preparatory discipline in the methods and results of introspective 
observation. (1894c, pxii). 
 
This emphasis on careful training in “in the methods and results of introspective 
observation” came up again in chapter three, where Morgan laid out in more detail the 
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epistemological and methodological problems facing the comparative psychologist and 
what he thought was the proper method for interpreting the minds of animals.28 
Central to the methodology that Morgan laid out was what he referred to as a 
“double induction” (1894c, p47-48). The first, “objective induction”, involved a detailed 
description of the observable aspects of animal behaviour, which required more than 
knowledge of the expression of the behaviour, but also knowledge of the animal’s habits 
and normal activities (1894c, p48-51). The second, “subjective induction”, required that 
one be familiar with one’s own conscious experiences, by way of introspection. From 
facts about one’s own consciousness, one could derive general laws of subjective 
experience. One could then use these general laws of subjective experience to theorize 
about how mind was involved in the behaviour one observed objectively—i.e., to make 
an ejective inference. 
As he had in the 1880s, Morgan worried about such ejective inferences being 
vulnerable to error. He insisted that the psychologist be an expert at making objective 
inductions—that is to say, in observing and studying animal behaviour itself—but just as 
important was that the psychologist also be an expert in the making of subjective 
inductions: 
 
Now it is idle to assert that one set of inductions is more important than the other, 
since both are essential. But there can be no question that the subjective 
inductions are in some respect more subtle and difficult and delicate than the 
inductions concerning objective phenomena…. And there can be no question that 
in the systematic training of the comparative psychologist the subjective aspect is 
not less important than the objective aspect. (1894c, p50, emphasis in the 
original). 
 
[W]hereas the man who has to deal with animals for practical purposes can afford 
to be ignorant of psychological methods and results, the man who would deal 
scientifically with the psychical faculties of animals cannot afford to be thus 
ignorant. For the practical man accuracy of observation and careful induction 
therefrom are of primary importance, validity of psychological interpretation 
being for him altogether subsidiary. But for the scientific investigator thorough 
and accurate knowledge of and training in psychology is of at least co-ordinate 
importance with accuracy of objective observation.  (1894c, p52). 
                                                
28 After the preface, Morgan included a prolegomena, which spelled out his dual-aspect monism about mind 
and body. Though there was a bigger focus on evolution as part of the argument for monism, not much of 
substance had changed since Animal Life and Intelligence. In chapters one and two, Morgan developed his 
theory of consciousness while borrowing an explicitly Jamesian terminology for it. 
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We can regard Morgan’s subjective induction as the process of coming up with candidate 
psychological explanations for the behaviour observed and then selecting which among 
them provided the best explanation for the observed behaviour—i.e., for the results of the 
objective induction. The “systematic training” that was needed here was one that 
inculcated an awareness of the range of potential psychological processes that could be at 
work behind a particular behaviour, which Morgan thought one could get through careful 
introspective analysis of the various sorts of processes that underlay one’s own 
behaviours in various circumstances, and an understanding of how such processes could 
be differentiated as candidate explanations through close consideration of behavioural 
observations. This harked back to his earlier concerns about the ejective method in the 
1886 Mind paper—that, even with human beings, one had to be careful not to assume that 
one’s own thoughts and experiences were shared by others, hence, one had to be fully 
aware of the range of different possible psychological routes to the same observable 
behaviour—only now Morgan was much more optimistic about be able to move beyond 
this point. As became clearer in later chapters of the book, awareness of there being a 
range of different potential explanations for a given animal’s behaviour meant that 
information about the developmental trajectory of particular behaviours was especially 
important as part of the objective induction, since it was here that one could most clearly 
see the role of different candidate processes (instinct, intelligence, and reason) at work, 
making the subjective induction to the best psychological explanation for the fully-
developed behaviour that much easier. Therefore, once one brought together “systematic 
and sustained” observation of animal behaviour—especially of its genesis over time—
with “knowledge of and training in psychology”, one would be in a much better place to 
get at the true underlying psychology of the species in question. Either of these on their 
own would not be enough. 
Crucial to Morgan’s point about the necessity of training in introspective 
psychology was evolution. Morgan was very critical of researchers who, in his view, 
placed too much emphasis on the idea that Darwin’s theory implied psychological 
similarities between other species and humans. Though Morgan did not explicitly direct 
his criticisms at Romanes in this context, it seems clear that Romanes was a target of such 
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criticism. For Romanes, psychological continuity across the animal kingdom was both the 
key implication of the theory of evolution by natural selection for psychology and the 
epistemic guarantor for the use of the ejective method in comparative psychology: 
without this foundational assumption, analogical inferences from our (introspective) 
knowledge of the nature of the psychological causes of human behaviour to the 
psychological causes of animal behaviour would have no justification. Moreover, as in 
the case of Romanes’ initial worries about being able to say anything about the 
psychology of invertebrates, whenever Romanes felt challenged to justify his confidence 
in being able to make substantive claims about the psychology of particular species based 
upon quite limited information about their behaviour, and in spite of his awareness that 
their life-ways were often so different to our own, this assumption of psychological 
continuity was brought to the fore. 
Morgan agreed that Darwin’s theory implied some measure of psychological 
continuity at the very broadest level: thanks to common ancestry and homologous neural 
structures, we could be sure that animals do possess minds and mental states. However, 
psychological similarities between species due to common ancestry should not be over-
emphasized at the expense of the other key part of Darwin’s theory of evolution: diversity 
between species brought about by natural selection, which tailored organisms to their 
respective environmental niches: 
 
[W]hy should the community [i.e. similarity] of psychical nature be greater than 
that of physical nature? ...The physical nature [of animals] being widely divergent 
from that of man, is it not reasonable to suppose that the psychical nature is, or at 
least may be, also widely divergent? (Morgan, 1894c, p40-41) 
 
Later on in the chapter, Morgan argued that the theory of evolution predicted a view of 
the distribution of psychological processes in nature that he called the “method of 
variation”, which led us to “expect that those mental faculties which could give decisive 
advantage in the struggle for existence would be developed in strict accordance with the 
divergent conditions of life” (1894c, p57).29 Thus, for Morgan, the broad degree of 
                                                
29 Morgan (1894c, p56-58) distinguished the method of variation from two other “methods” for thinking 
about the similarities and differences between humans and animals: the “method of levels” and the “method 
of uniform reduction”. According to the method of levels, all animals share certain mental faculties, but 
only humans possess “higher” mental faculties: “thus the dog is just like me, without my higher faculties”; 
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psychological continuity implied by Darwin’s theory was quite consistent with different 
species possessing very different mentalities, varying according to the different 
environmental challenges that they faced.30 Though Morgan would no doubt have said 
that Romanes was much more careful than many of his correspondents in this respect, 
Morgan was certainly directing his ire at least in part at Romanes when he drew attention 
to this neglected flip-side of the evolutionary process. 
Given all of this, Morgan emphasized that comparative psychology needed more 
than just cursory interpretation of the available behavioural evidence. Interpretations 
needed to be informed by “knowledge of and training in psychology”, which offered a 
range of different potential psychological explanations for a given animal’s behaviour 
that one could then try to choose between. It was within this context that Morgan 
introduced the Canon:  
 
For in the study of animal psychology as a branch of scientific inquiry, it is 
necessary that accurate observation, and a sound knowledge of the biological 
relationships of animals, should go hand in hand with a thorough appreciation of 
the methods and results of modern psychology. The only fruitful method of 
procedure is the interpretation of facts observed with due care in the light of 
sound psychological principles.   
What some of these principles are we have considered, or shall consider, 
in this work.  There is one basal principle, however, the brief exposition of which 
may fitly bring to a close this chapter. It may be thus stated:---In no case may we 
interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise of a higher psychical faculty, if 
it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one which stands lower in 
the psychological scale. (1894c, p53, emphasis in the original). 
 
The italicized sentence is, of course, the Canon. However, we should not ignore the 
sentences preceding it. Comparative psychologists needed to have a “thorough 
appreciation of the methods and results of modern psychology”. Once again, the point 
                                                                                                                                            
while according to the method of uniform reduction, all animals share the same faculties, but these are 
more highly developed in humans. Of the three “methods”, the method of variation was the one most 
consistent with the “principles of evolution” and “the least anthropomorphic, and therefore the most 
difficult” to apply in practice. 
30 Crucially, Morgan’s point wasn't just about diversity in the level of mental faculties possessed—i.e., the 
extent to which a species relied on instinct versus intelligence or reason—but also diversity in the form that 
similar mental faculties could take in species adapted to different environmental niches. Morgan was one of 
the first animal scientists to take seriously the idea that the differing sensory capacities and demands of 
species was important to understanding the nature and structure of their minds. We thank a reviewer for 
emphasizing this to us.   
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was that researchers needed to be aware of different possible ways to explain a given 
animal’s behaviour. This provided key motivation for the Canon: that one should not leap 
to “higher” explanations of behaviour—e.g., in terms of the operation of reason—when 
“lower” explanations in terms of reflex, instinct, or intelligence were available. Crucially, 
it was not enough to defend higher explanations just on grounds of their putative 
“simplicity”: 
 
Is it not simpler to explain the higher activities of animals as the direct outcome of 
reason or intellectual thought, than to explain them as the complex results of mere 
intelligence or practical sense experience? Undoubtedly, it may in many cases 
seem simpler. It is the apparent simplicity of the explanation that leads many 
people to naively adopt it. But surely the simplicity of an explanation is no 
necessary criterion of its truth. (1894c, p54-55). 
 
As well as rejecting simplicity as legitimate criterion for deciding between rival 
explanations, Morgan also thought that a general preference for attributing higher 
psychological capacities to animals (be it on grounds of “simplicity” or otherwise) ran 
against a proper understanding of evolution. Thus, a few pages later, in his discussion of 
the “method of variation”, mentioned earlier, Morgan came back to the Canon:  
 
[I]t is clear that any animal may be at a stage where certain higher faculties have 
not yet been evolved from their lower precursors; and hence we are logically 
bound not to assume the existence of these higher faculties until good reasons 
shall have been shown for such existence. In other words, we are bound to accept 
the principle above enunciated: that in no case is an animal activity to be 
interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of a higher psychical faculty, if it can 
be fairly interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one which stands lower in 
the psychological scale.” (1894c, p59). 
 
Here we see Morgan connecting the Canon with the claim that higher faculties must 
evolve out of lower ones, and that for any species the higher faculties may not have 
developed. Hence, higher faculties could not just be assumed, and we needed to take 
extra care to rule out lower explanations. This was, in Morgan’s words, the “logical 
basis” for the Canon. 
The above passage raises an important interpretive issue that has received very 
little attention in previous discussions of Morgan’s work: there is a crucial ambiguity in 
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how Morgan stated and applied the Canon. When Morgan says that we shouldn't interpret 
behaviour as the product of a higher faculty when explanations in terms of lower faculties 
are available, are we meant to actively endorse the lower explanation over the higher one, 
or are we merely to withhold judgement—i.e., not “assume” the existence of the higher 
faculty—until additional evidence helps us to decide? In other words, is the Canon meant 
to be just a cautionary methodological principle that merely urges us not to endorse 
higher explanations too quickly, or is it meant to be something more like a decision 
principle that helps us to decide between rival higher and lower explanations when the 
behavioural evidence by itself fails to decide between them, and which actively favours 
lower explanations? Morgan has almost universally been interpreted as proposing the 
latter, and this is how the Canon is generally presented when it is invoked by modern 
comparative psychologists (see Fitzpatrick, 2008). However, in later chapters, Morgan 
himself actually seemed equivocate on how strong the Canon was meant to be—
sometimes applying it merely to claim that a higher explanation is unsupported, and 
sometimes using it to explicitly defend the lower explanation. Compare, for instance, the 
first two passages below, which have more of a merely cautionary ring to them when it 
comes to endorsing the higher explanation, with the third, which actively endorses the 
lower explanation: 
 
In accordance with our canon of interpretation, therefore, we are bound to assume 
no more without further warrant. (1894, p248, emphasis added). 
 
[I]f the facts, supposing them to be biologically well founded, can be explained on 
the hypothesis of sense-experience, the greater appetence prevailing, we are 
bound by our canon of interpretation not to assume the higher faculty of 
perception. (1894, p370, emphasis added) 
 
The question is: Can we or can we not explain the dog's action as the outcome of 
sense-experience, as indicative of intelligence profiting by association? I do not 
see how this can be denied. …And if so, the canon of interpretation, so often 
referred to, makes it imperative for us who adopt it to accept the interpretation of 
the action as due to the simpler exercise of intelligence based on sense-experience 
rather than that according to which the dog perceived the relation between the 
chord and its arc. (1894, p302) 
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Despite this seeming equivocation, Morgan clearly did use the Canon to advocate 
lower explanations, and generally expressed preferences for lower explanations when he 
saw them as able to explain the evidence. The motivation for this seemed to stem from 
the view of mental evolution discussed above: given that higher faculties must evolve out 
of lower ones, higher faculties must be rarer in nature than lower ones (for a modern 
critique of Morgan’s reasoning, see Sober, 1998). 
However, there is still, in our view, something wrong with viewing the Canon 
primarily as a preference for lower over higher, since this obscures what we see as the 
core message the Canon was meant to convey: the desperate need for the kind of 
experimental approach to studying animal behaviour he described in the preface and in 
more detail later on in the book. As we have seen, the primary concern of this third 
chapter was the proper application of the ejective method, which Morgan emphasized, 
required proper training in performing the “subjective induction”—i.e., a proper 
appreciation of the range of possible psychological processes that could lie behind 
particular behaviour—and a thorough understanding of the external aspects of the 
behaviour itself (the “objective induction”). What was wrong with those theorists that had 
leapt to higher accounts of animal behaviour too quickly was that they had “assume [d] 
this complexity of mental nature on grounds other than those of sound induction” and 
thus “depart[ed] from the methods of scientific procedure” (1894c, p55). Since Morgan 
now saw the careful experimental study of the development of behaviour—in the manner 
of Mann Jones and his own experiments—as the key way to settle questions about the 
nature of animal cognition, rather than seeing it fundamentally as a decision principle, 
and hence as a call to prefer lower explanations, the Canon should primarily be seen as a 
call for this new programme of investigation.31 
 
                                                
31 As noted earlier, Radick (2000, 2007) traces the original motivation for the Canon, when Morgan first 
proposed it to the International Congress of Experimental Psychology in 1892 (Morgan, 1892a, p44), to his 
claims about the dependency of higher psychological capacities on language: “For Morgan, the canon was 
needed because animals, lacking language, probably lacked reason” (Radick, 2000, p4). However, Radick 
argues that around 1893 Morgan developed doubts about this denial of reason to animals, due to his hearing 
about the American naturalist R.L Garner’s expedition to the Congo with the aim of providing 
phonographic proof of the existence of verbal language in apes. This led Morgan to re-frame the Canon in 
evolutionary terms in the Introduction. Whether or not Radick is correct about this change in rationale for 
the Canon, the principle should still be seen in the experimental context we have described. 
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8. Concluding remarks 
We have argued that Morgan underwent two quite different shifts of attitude toward the 
proper practice of comparative psychology. The first, which took place in the years 
leading up to the publication of Animal Life and Intelligence was a move away from his 
initial epistemic scepticism about the ejective method, towards a qualified acceptance of 
the Romanesian approach to comparative psychology. This was motivated by his 
evolving philosophy of science, which moved from a strict empiricism focused 
exclusively on observational verification, towards a more sophisticated empiricism that 
emphasized coherence (“congruity”) as a test for truth in addition to direct observational 
verification. The second shift, which took place around 1891-3 was the realization that an 
experimental approach focused on development provided a much more promising route 
to getting at the true underlying nature of animal psychology than the largely theoretical, 
synthesizing, Romanesian approach. Though this move towards experimental methods 
was not entirely new, given his early experimental work on suicide in scorpions, and was 
very much in line with wider trends in contemporary biology, Morgan’s correspondence 
with Mann Jones nonetheless played a vital stimulating and shaping role in this second 
shift in attitude, which ultimately led to Morgan’s mature vision for comparative 
psychology. The mature Morgan fully accepted the Romanesian view that we needed to 
interpret animal behaviour ejectively, but he saw that this required a detailed 
understanding of the range of possible psychological processes that could account for a 
given behaviour, and that we understood the developmental trajectory of the behaviour in 
all of its aspects. Such a developmental-experimental approach could make the ejective 
method that much more powerful. 
It is only in the context of this new approach that Morgan’s famous Canon can be 
fully understood. In particular, the Canon shouldn't be viewed simply as a preference for 
lower over higher (though Morgan certainly did have such a preference), but rather as a 
refrain to those who would settle on accounts of animal psychology too quickly, and a 
call for more thorough experimental investigation of the genesis of animal behaviour. 
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